Marine fisheries and future ocean conflict by Spijkers, Jessica et al.
798  |    Fish and Fisheries. 2018;19:798–806.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/faf
1  | INTRODUC TION
Policymakers are growing increasingly concerned about conflicts 
overfishery resources (Germond, 2015; Hassani- Mahmooei & Parris, 
2013). Wild capture fisheries production has stagnated over the last 
20 years (FAO, 2014; Pauly et al., 2003, Worm, 2016), and climate 
change is expected to alter the distributions and potential yields of 
exploited marine species (Cheung et al., 2010; Miller, Munro, Sumaila, 
& Cheung, 2013; Sumaila, Cheung, Lam, Pauly, & Herrick, 2011; UNEP, 
2015). Meanwhile, global demand for marine protein is growing (Béné 
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Ghoti papers
Ghoti aims to serve as a forum for stimulating and pertinent ideas. Ghoti publishes succinct commentary and opinion that addresses important areas in fish 
and fisheries science. Ghoti contributions will be innovative and have a perspective that may lead to fresh and productive insight of concepts, issues and re-
search agendas. All Ghoti contributions will be selected by the editors and peer reviewed.
Etymology of Ghoti
George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950), polymath, playwright, Nobel prize winner, and the most prolific letter writer in history, was an advocate of English spelling re-
form. He was reportedly fond of pointing out its absurdities by proving that ‘fish’ could be spelt ‘ghoti’. That is: ‘gh’ as in ‘rough’, ‘o’ as in ‘women’ and ‘ti’ as in palatial.
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Abstract
Conflict over marine fishery resources is a growing security concern. Experts expect 
that global changes in our climate, food systems and oceans may spark or exacerbate 
resource conflicts. An initial scan of 803 relevant papers and subsequent intensive 
review of 31 fisheries conflict studies, focused on subnational and international con-
flicts, suggests that four substantial scientific gaps need addressing to improve our 
understanding of the nature and drivers of fisheries conflict. First, fisheries conflict 
and levels of conflict intensity are not precisely defined. Second, complex adaptive 
systems thinking is underutilized but has the potential to produce more realistic 
causal models of fishery conflict. Third, comparative large- scale data and suitably 
integrative methodologies are lacking, underscoring the need for a standardized and 
comparable database of fisheries conflict cases to aid extrapolation beyond single 
case- studies. Fourth, there is room for a more widespread application of higher order 
concepts and associated terminology. Importantly, the four gaps highlight the ho-
mogenized nature of current methodological and theoretical approaches to under-
standing fishery conflict, which potentially presents us with an oversimplified 
understanding of these conflicts. A more nuanced understanding of the complex and 
dynamic nature of fishery conflict and its causes is not only scientifically critical, but 
increasingly relevant for policymakers and practitioners in this turbulent world.
K E Y W O R D S
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et al., 2015), particularly in vulnerable regions that depend on fish for 
food security (Allison et al., 2009; Blasiak et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 
2015). A number of militarized international post- World War II con-
flicts have already been driven by disagreements overfishing quotas 
and maritime boundaries (Mitchell & Prins, 1999), including many on-
going, high- profile disputes (Box 1). The occurrence of conflicts over-
fisheries is thus expected to become more common (EFARO, 2012).
However, there is still limited consensus on the fundamental 
causes or mechanisms connecting natural resources to conflict, and 
linkages between changing climate conditions and security issues 
remain unclear (Gemenne, Barnett, Adger, & Dabelko, 2014). Efforts 
to describe such linkages in the case of fishery resources have been 
criticized as overly simplistic (Penney, Wilson, & Rodwell, 2017). This 
growing criticism stems from the increased understanding that ma-
rine social–ecological systems (SESs) are complex adaptive systems 
(CAS), characterized by nonlinear dynamics and multiple possible out-
comes (Hughes, Bellwood, Folke, Steneck, & Wilson, 2005; Morrison, 
2017; Österblom et al., 2013), and that conflict over marine resources 
can itself be an outcome as well as a driver within those systems 
(Pomeroy, Parks, Mrakovcich, & LaMonica, 2016). In this review, we 
test the validity of the claim of simplicity (Penney et al., 2017) by as-
sessing the degree to which the fisheries conflict literature, encom-
passing both subnational and international conflict, has incorporated 
ideas from complexity theory and SESs theory and identifying areas 
within this literature that would benefit from further development.
2  | METHODOLOGY
We used a broad title–abstract keyword search of the Scopus data-
base to identify 1,941 relevant articles, which were analysed using 
data mining tools provided by the R package tm using the search 
phrases: “fish” OR “fishery” AND “conflict” OR “dispute” or “war” 
(Feinerer & Hornik, 2017). This data mining process was executed to 
understand the geographic focus of the papers (Figure S1). We then 
narrowed the scope of the analysis by including only those articles 
within the subject areas of social sciences and economics and ex-
cluding papers from disciplines with a less clear connection to con-
flict (e.g., health sciences). This resulted in a set of 803 articles. We 
reviewed the abstracts of these articles and selected those dealing 
with the roots of past or ongoing conflict over a specific marine fish 
or fishery (excluding, for example, theoretical papers on fishery con-
flict or papers discussing potential future conflicts). For each of the 
resulting 31 papers, we extracted information on their geographical 
focus, species, methodology, data sources and theoretical framing 
(Appendix S1).
Given the concerns raised by Penney et al. (2017), we approached 
the review with an a priori interest in the degree to which integra-
tive SES thinking is applied in understanding fisheries conflict. The 
SES literature deals with questions around sustainable development 
and promotes the idea of holism rather than fragmentation (Hjorth & 
Bagheri 2006, Levin et al., 2012). The literature therefore provides a 
potentially useful integrative lens for a more holistic understanding 
of fisheries conflicts. SES outcomes result from complex interactions 
between social and ecological variables; the literature on SESs strives 
to reflect this complexity through its choice of methodologies, theo-
ries and data sources. Work on SESs seeks to unveil and understand 
the complexity of social–ecological change overtime, accounting for 
feedbacks and path dependency, and uses empirical data to do so 
(Österblom et al., 2013). Taking an integrative SES approach helps us 
understand the diverse social and biophysical outcomes we observe 
in the world, of which conflict over resources is one.
Box 1 Examples of current, unresolved fishery 
disputes
South China Sea: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Brunei currently have competing claims over parts 
of the South China Sea, including the Paracels and Spratlys, and 
dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs (BBC 
News, 2016a; Song & TØnnesson, 2013). In the 1980s and 
1990s, Vietnamese and Chinese fatalities occurred in battles 
over the Paracels and Spratlys. The rich fishing grounds that 
supply the livelihoods of people across the region are a signifi-
cant part of the wealth of the South China Sea, although fisher-
ies are often ignored by conventional narratives which focus on 
the large reserves of natural resources such as minerals and oil 
that the area under dispute is estimated to harbour (BBC News, 
2016a; Dupont & Baker, 2014). In 2016, the Philippines coun-
tered Chinese claims through a tribunal of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which ruled in 
favour of the Philippines (BBC News, 2016a,b). However, China 
continues to regard these fishery resources as critical to its 
food security and thus as a strategic commodity (Dupont & 
Baker, 2014).
Northeast Atlantic: The “mackerel dispute” between Norway, 
the European Union (EU), Iceland and the Faroe Islands erupted 
in 2007 when the northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scom-
brus) stocks began spawning further towards the north- west of 
the Nordic Seas and their surrounding waters (Gänsbauer et al., 
2016, ICES Advisory Committee, 2014; Nøttestad et al., 2014). 
Iceland (which now finds mackerel within its Exclusive Economic 
Zone) did not originally include mackerel in its coastal state 
management plans. The migration not only resulted in increased 
overfishing of the stock, but the subsequent dispute also 
eroded the legitimacy and functioning of existing management 
plans (ICES Advisory Committee, 2014, Spijkers & Boonstra, 
2017, World Ocean Review, 2016). A few years after the shift in 
mackerel distribution, the relevant parties attempted, but 
failed, to include Iceland in the agreement negotiations. At the 
time of writing, Iceland has still not been formally involved in 
the agreements on the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota 
allocations per country.
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To identify gaps in the application of SES concepts and complex 
systems approaches to the fisheries conflict literature, we evalu-
ated existing studies against the following a priori criteria: (i) clar-
ity in definitions and applications of key terms; (ii) consideration of 
feedbacks, thresholds and nonlinearity; (iii) use of comparative ap-
proaches and suitably integrative methodologies; and (iv) usage of 
higher order systems concepts, as indicated by the presence of as-
sociated terminology (e.g., resilience, vulnerability, and emergence).
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Clarity in definitions and applications of key 
terms
Comparison of articles on conflict suggested that current fishery 
conflict typologies often conflate conflicts overfish as a resource 
with general conflicts taking place within the fisheries space, leaving 
the concept “fishery conflict” poorly defined. According to one ty-
pology, for instance, “types of fisheries- related conflicts” encompass 
both conflicts overfish stocks as well as maritime crime and general 
civil unrest (Pomeroy et al., 2016). Another typology (Bennett et al., 
2001) does not distinguish between ownership/management con-
flicts overfish and conflicts between different users of the fisheries 
space. It therefore could include conflicts between fishermen and 
the tourist industry over access and use of coastal areas, although 
such disputes are not necessarily triggered by fish as a resource. 
These typologies may reflect the complexity of conflicts in marine 
areas, but differentiating between conflicts overfish as a natural re-
source and conflicts that simply occur in the same place where fish-
ing is happening is useful if we wish to better understand the root 
causes of conflict. Such distinctions are possible for common pool 
resources: access rights refer to “the right to enter a defined physi-
cal property,” while withdrawal rights describe “the right to obtain 
the ‘products’ of a resource (e.g., catch fish)” (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1993, pp. 14–15; see also Bavinck, 2005). Using the insights from the 
common pool resource literature in marine environments, “physical 
property” relates to the sea space or territory, whereas “products” 
include fish stocks (Bavinck, 2005). Making this distinction is im-
portant when analyzing the different types and potential causes of 
fishery conflict, as conflicts overfish as a resource could have drivers 
(such as the value of a particular stock) that would be largely inde-
pendent of conflicts within the general marine space, where terri-
tory represents the resource.
Second, the term “fishery conflict” is applied to diverse case- 
studies, without explicitly recognizing the differing intensities 
of conflict. Three papers provide typologies of fisheries conflict 
(Bennett et al., 2001; Charles, 1992; Pomeroy et al., 2016), and two 
of these suggest that different intensity levels of conflict exist. But 
none of these typologies explicitly distinguishes among different 
intensity levels of conflict, nor how such levels could be identified 
despite the fact that the existence of a “violence gradient”’ has been 
emphasized “[c]onflicts of this type do not necessarily have to be 
violent nor highly disruptive, in fact many conflicts that arise as a 
result of differing interests are low- level, non- violent phenomena” 
(Bennett et al., 2001, pp. 366). Distinguishing between the differ-
ent amplitudes and impacts of fisheries conflicts would help de-
termine whether there are separate drivers of conflict leading to 
different “intensity outcomes.” For example, extremely violent con-
flicts may exhibit very different causal patterns than non- violent 
disagreements, and cooccur more frequently with certain variables, 
or contextual conditions. Such an intensity scale would also facil-
itate differentiation among various levels of conflict and explore 
patterns and cycles causing non- violent disputes to transform into 
violent conflict (Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Salehyan, 2008). 
Likewise, it could aid the identification of variables that have a 
determining impact on feeding or mitigating conflict, causing co-
operative/peaceful systems to shift into “fishery conflict regimes” 
exhibiting hostility and even violence. A scale of conflict intensities 
would enable analysis of conflict and cooperation across a gradient, 
where certain variables could be “tipping points” for a system to 
shift back into a lesser state of conflict. Researchers dealing with 
other types of natural resource conflicts have already identified 
such conflict gradients, for instance for freshwater resources (Wolf, 
Yoffe, & Giordano, 2003).
Current conceptual typologies of fishery conflict (Bennett et al., 
2001; Charles, 1992; Pomeroy et al., 2016) could be enhanced by 
adding several components that would facilitate comparability in 
the identification and characterization of fishery conflict. These in-
clude (i) a precise definition of what constitutes a fishery conflict; (ii) 
a gradient or categorization of conflict intensity; (iii) a specification 
of which actions and behaviours indicate different levels or types 
of conflict intensity. In Table 1, we propose a new and more gener-
ally applicable typology of potential fishery conflict intensities, ex-
panded from examples from the environmental security literature on 
freshwater resources (e.g., “the BAR Scale of Intensity of Conflict and 
Cooperation” in Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003; Brochmann, 2012; 
Bernauer & Bohmelt, 2014). Drawing on reviewed case- studies of 
fisheries conflicts, we linked five different intensities to observable 
behaviours and actions within international fishery conflicts. The 
South China Sea conflict (Box 1), for example, has seen many mili-
tary interventions with displays of violence (Delisle, 2012), while the 
mackerel dispute has not seen this same level of hostile acts, yet is 
marked by diplomatic–economic hostile acts such as termination of 
agreements and trade/landing bans (Spijkers & Boonstra, 2017).
3.2 | Consideration of feedbacks, 
thresholds, and nonlinearity
Few of the reviewed papers explicitly address causal complexity by 
comprehensively assessing multiple potential conflict drivers and in-
tervening variables that are empirically derived. Several shed light on 
the issue of fishery conflict through the theoretical framings of in-
ternational or customary law, for example (5 of 31). In these papers, 
the focus generally lies on understanding the use and importance 
of certain legal measures within disputes, not explicitly identifying 
potential causes or contributing factors outside of that realm of 
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study (Appendix S1). Framing an analysis around a particular con-
cept or variable can result in a linear representation of cause and 
effect, not explicitly recognizing potential feedbacks, thresholds 
and nonlinearity. In some cases, however, these authors point to the 
complex causal reality of conflict; Silk (2001), for instance, uses an 
international law framing, noting that “the issues underlying even a 
single- species fishery dispute are often complex, ranging from legal 
issues, biological issues, and economics, to politics” (Silk, 2001, pp. 
792). Many papers reference a multitude of variables throughout 
the text including poor governance (e.g., DuBois & Zografos, 2012; 
Muawanah, Pomeroy, & Marlessy, 2012) and declining resource 
abundance (e.g., van Herten & Runhaar, 2013; Perez, 2009; Song, 
1997), but these papers never set out to empirically derive these 
variables nor to test for their relationship with conflict.
Another example of a linear and potentially oversimplified idea 
of fishery conflict is the concept of eco- scarcity, according to which 
the scarcity of fishery resources leads to increased competition, 
which in turn leads to conflict. Little empirical evidence currently 
exists within the fisheries conflict literature to support claims of 
eco- scarcity as the driver for conflict (Penney et al., 2017). Yet, it is 
an a priori assumption underpinning much of the work on fisheries 
conflict, including the “fish wars cycle” described by Pomeroy et al. 
(2016). Other scholars have also remarked that “conflicts within fish-
eries can be oversimplified by resource scarcity narratives” (Penney 
et al., 2017, pp. 46) and have called for an investigation of more com-
plex and multidimensional causes of conflict.
The two studies of fisheries conflict that have assessed multi-
ple potential conflict drivers (Muawanah et al., 2012; Pomeroy et al., 
2007) generated a deeper and more nuanced understanding of how 
conflict emerges, and how multiple factors have influenced observed 
conflicts. However, these papers are focused on conflict at the sub-
national scale. At the regional and international scales, the primary 
focus has seldom been to assess the relative importance of an array 
of variables, but instead to tell the story of how the dispute emerged 
and changed over time. Moreover, scholars who have focused on 
international fisheries cooperation have generally based their em-
pirical analysis on a single variable, for instance, the maximization of 
economic incentives in game theoretic applications (Bailey, Sumaila, 
& Lindroos, 2010; Hannesson, 2011). Attempting to retroactively 
understand conflict or to predict it with such approaches, especially 
on international scales, reduces the complexity that underlies such 
conflicts and can result in simplistic conclusions.
We argue that the scholarship could benefit from explicitly ad-
dressing causal complexity. This would require comprehensively 
assessing multiple potential conflict drivers (biophysical, socio- 
political, institutional and economic) that are empirically derived, 
and the relationships between them. Moreover, conflict should not 
be seen as solely the outcome of a process, but also as a variable that 
can feed back into the system. Complex adaptive systems thinking 
can be a useful framing tool, as it recognizes nonlinear feedbacks, 
multiple causes, effects and intervening variables that are linked by 
interactive, synergistic and nonlinear causation that can also oper-
ate across different timescales (Cumming, Olsson, Chapin, & Holling, 
2013; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005; Levin et al., 2012; 
Lubchenco, Cerny- Chipman, Reimer, & Levin, 2016). Researchers 
dealing with other types of renewable and non- renewable resource 
conflicts have applied elements of CAS thinking to varying degrees 
in contexts characterized as complex and dynamic. In the freshwater 
literature, for example, emphasis has shifted from trying to identify 
single causes to instead explore environment- conflict connections 
that are substantially caused or affected by political and socio- 
economic factors (Homer- Dixon, 2001; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014; 
von Uexkull, Croicu, Fjelde, & Buhaug, 2016; Yoffe et al., 2004).
Addressing complexity more explicitly will allow us to dis-
tinguish between “necessary” and “sufficient” causes of fishery 
conflict, and the interactions between the two. In the case of nec-
essary causes, the observed outcome of conflict would not have 
TA B L E  1   Categorization of fishery conflict intensities, linked to 
their observable actions and behaviours. Developed as an example 
for applicability to international fishery conflicts
Intensity of observed behaviour/action
Intensity Description
5 Military acts causing death
Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast 
Guards, with resulting deaths
4 Military acts
Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast 
Guards, no death toll
3 Political–military hostile acts
Sending out police vessels/warships
Seize vessel and/or crew
Gear destruction
Reinforcing borders
2 Diplomatic–economic hostile acts









1 Verbal expressions displaying discord or hostility in 
interaction
Failing to reach an agreement
Making threatening demands and accusations
Threatening sanctions
Condemning specific actions, behaviours or policies
Requesting change in policy
Civilian protests
0 Non- significant acts
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happened in the absence of the cause in question; for sufficient 
causes, the observed conflict outcome might have been the same 
regardless of the cause in question (Mahoney, 2008). Translated to 
the world of fisheries conflicts, in some cases, perhaps a decline 
in the resource is a necessary factor to produce a conflict condi-
tion, while an ongoing jurisdictional boundary conflict could be a 
sufficient one. Understanding the distinction between these two 
types of causes is pertinent for assessing, the growing concern that 
climate change will influence the likelihood of conflict overfishery 
resources.
3.3 | Use of comparative approaches and integrative 
methodologies
From the 31 papers that we reviewed in depth, only four offered an 
analysis across multiple conflict case- studies and only two of these 
used quantitative methods. This means that most papers have ana-
lysed single cases of conflict in a qualitative manner, and that little 
has been done to systematically compile quantitative, historical evi-
dence of fisheries conflict. Although single, qualitative case- studies 
on fishery conflict are valuable, comprehensive quantitative studies 
on fishery conflict could help us understand linkages and dynamics 
across multiple case- studies and over time.
The lack of comparative data and analysis has restricted un-
derstanding of the prevalence and geography of fishery conflicts 
around the world. The majority of the studies assessed here deal 
with conflicts among states in the North Pacific and North Atlantic; 
for instance between the US and Canada (8 of 31) or, more recently, 
conflicts involving Asian actors such as Japan (Appendix S1). Such 
trends are also apparent from the text- mining analysis applied to the 
larger set of 1,941 conflict articles. We found that the majority of 
work has focused on the world’s most industrialized countries, with 
few studies in the least developed countries, a trend that seems to 
be continuing (Figure 1).
Second, the lack of large sets of comparative data means schol-
ars have not been able to test if certain relationships between vari-
ables that have been anecdotally connected to fishery conflict exist 
across a larger set of cases. Case- studies of fishery conflict (e.g., 
in Box 1) suggest general patterns, but empirical analysis of (large) 
comparable datasets is necessary to resolve questions of causality. 
Obtaining such data can help to validate the robustness of the re-
lationships suggested by case- studies on fisheries conflicts, and to 
investigate new potential relationships that would inform a realistic 
model for fisheries conflict. The predominance of qualitative single 
case- studies has generated depth and richness but also represents a 
lack of comprehensiveness in methodologies available to understand 
F I G U R E  1   Frequency with which the fishery conflict literature from 2007 to 2016 referred to countries within specific (a) socio- economic 
groupings; (b) regional groupings. The United Nations has identified 47 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), characterized by low levels of socio- 
economic development; conversely, the 35 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are among the 
world’s most highly industrialized countries. Hierarchical clustering and color- coded frequency (blue representing the lowest frequency and red 
the highest) are provided at the top of each heatmap. Data source: Scopus 2016 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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and explain fishery conflict. Expanding the methodological toolbox 
to include Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) or agent- based com-
puter simulations could advance efforts to understand the variables 
associated with fishery conflict (Helbing, 2013).
A global database of fishery conflicts would provide the large- 
scale comparative data needed to (i) get an understanding of the 
geography and prevalence of fishery disputes over time; (ii) test for 
relationships between conflict variables across multiple cases; and 
(iii) open the door for a more diversified repertoire of methodolo-
gies. Research on other forms of natural resource conflicts provides 
useful guidance in this respect. The systematic collection of data 
on conflict over freshwater resources (Transboundary Freshwater 
Dispute Database), for example, resulted in a framework for quan-
titative, global- scale assessments of the relationship between 
freshwater resources and international cooperation and conflict 
(Yoffe et al., 2004). Here, the approach was to use a standardized 
event database to move beyond the case- study approach to include 
large sets of GIS and contextual data. This theoretical and empirical 
foundation enabled scholars to use forecasting methods to assess 
the predictive power of selected explanatory factors (Bernauer & 
Bohmelt, 2014). Drawing on some of these tested approaches could 
provide promising avenues for expanding our knowledge of fishery 
conflicts.
3.4 | Usage of higher order systems concepts and 
associated terminology
In SES research, higher order concepts and terminology are used to 
describe pattern–process dynamics that emerge from complex sys-
tem interactions and dynamics. Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, Link, 
and Schilling (2012) have argued that debates describing links be-
tween the climate system, natural resources, societal stability and 
human security lack complexity. In trying to inject some of that miss-
ing complexity back into the research, they use higher order systems 
terminology to describe the links between natural resources, the cli-
mate and conflict, that is the terms “resilience,” “adaptation/adaptive 
capacity,” “vulnerability,” “sensitivity,” “feedbacks,” “tipping points” 
and “thresholds.” We searched our selected review articles to de-
termine whether the literature on conflict overfishery resources had 
implemented this terminology in their analyses.
Twenty of the 31 reviewed papers did not use higher order sys-
tems terminology, and the large majority of those not using any such 
terms are papers from disciplines such as law and international re-
lations. Within those scientific communities, it is not often explic-
itly recognized that there is a complex set of interactions between 
the climate system, natural resources, human security and societal 
stability, as they often approach the topic of fishery conflicts to un-
derstand a single variable such as the effectiveness of a particular 
international regulation. However, several fishery conflict scholars 
have used higher order systems terminology such as “vulnerability” 
and “adaptive capacity” to reflect their recognition of complexities in 
the relationships between natural resources, the climate system and 
conflict; here, we describe a few of these usages.
The first to explicitly acknowledge the complexity of marine SES, 
and conflict as a component within that system, through the usage 
of higher order systems terminology was Charles (1992): “In any bio- 
socio- economic system as complex and as dynamic as a fishery, with 
its many interactions amongst natural resources, humans and insti-
tutions, it is hardly surprising that conflict tends to be prevalent”. 
In that same year, Mirovitskaya and Haney (1992) also recognized 
the complexity of marine SES and threshold within those and explic-
itly mentioned the interconnectedness of conflicts overfishery re-
sources. However, the use of higher order systems terminology was 
restricted to terms merely describing marine systems as complex 
and interconnected, not yet using concepts such as “vulnerability,” 
“resilience” or “adaptive capacity” to describe the internal properties 
of the marine SES.
From 2000, Miller (co)- authored four papers that at first ap-
plied the terms “sensitivity,” “resilience,” and later on used the terms 
“vulnerability,” “adaptive capacity,” and “thresholds” in the con-
text of conflict within marine SES. In the latest paper, for example, 
“resilience” and “adaptability” are used by the authors to connect 
changing dynamics of fishery resources induced by the climate to 
emerging conflict: they argue that to effectively govern shared fish-
eries in the face of changing environmental conditions “(…) mech-
anisms to improve the resilience and adaptability of cooperative 
management arrangements to environmental perturbations” are 
needed (Miller et al., 2013, pp. 326). After Miller, a few authors used 
the term “vulnerability” (albeit exclusively in papers approaching 
fishery conflict from a natural resource management perspective) 
to describe the links between overfishing, vulnerability to climate 
impacts and conflict.
An important contribution in the usage of higher order sys-
tems terminology comes from a paper by Gänsbauer, Bechtold, and 
Wilfing (2016), where it is explicitly recognized that there is a “neces-
sity to acknowledge [the current international fishery management] 
as a complex adaptive system”. They introduce new concepts such as 
“emergent properties” and “nested hierarchies” into the description 
of marine SESs and the role of conflict. However, the terms are used 
only a single time as a descriptor of the system and not as tools for 
analysis. Nonetheless, the paper marks a shift into a deeper scien-
tific understanding of the characteristics of marine SESs that can 
help us to understand conflict overfishery resources.
4  | CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF 
FISHERIES CONFLIC T RESE ARCH
A rapidly expanding body of research dealing with fisheries conflict 
suggests a growing interest and concern over the potential for in-
creased conflict overfishery resources. This concern is justified from 
a historical perspective, as fisheries have been connected to conflict 
through an array of potential mediating variables such as climate 
variability, rapid population growth, social inequality and the expan-
sion of economic zones around coastal nations. All of these factors 
are projected to remain or even intensify in future years. Greater 
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understanding of the risk potential of commonly cited drivers such 
as climate variability will depend on filling in gaps in the fisheries 
conflict literature. The four gaps that we have identified are:
1. The lack of fishery conflict definitions that are precise, that 
distinguish among degrees of conflict intensity and that specify 
which actions or behaviours are indicative of different levels 
of conflict intensity.
2. The absence of (large sets) of comparative conflict data, and con-
sequently narrowness in the methods used to assess the drivers 
of fishery conflict.
3. The lack of theoretical framings that explicitly recognize nonlinear 
and dynamic feedbacks, multiple causes, effects and intervening 
variables; and that are translated into appropriate methodologies 
for complexity.
4. Although the complexity of marine SES and conflict’s role within 
that system is recognized through the use of terms such as “adap-
tive capacity” and “vulnerability,” there is room for a more wide-
spread extension of higher order concepts and associated 
terminology.
As the topic of fishery conflict becomes increasingly salient 
and considering the well- documented importance of fisheries for 
human well- being, researchers focused on fisheries conflict are well- 
positioned to make a practical contribution to more sustainable and 
cooperative use of fisheries resources. Doing so will require supple-
menting individual case- studies with more generalizable approaches to 
develop a deeper understanding of the complex interaction between 
drivers of fisheries conflict and how to avoid or mitigate them. This will 
enable more precision and a deeper understanding that is not only sci-
entifically significant, but increasingly important for policymakers and 
practitioners operating in a turbulent world.
ACKNOWLEDG EMENTS
This is a product of the Nippon Foundation Nereus Program, a col-
laborative initiative by the Nippon Foundation and partners includ-
ing the Stockholm Resilience Center. Funding was also provided by 
GRAID (Guidance for Resilience in the Anthropocene – Investments 
for Development), Mistra (through a core grant to Stockholm 
Resilience Centre) and the Australian Research Council Centre of 
Excellence for Coral Reef Studies.
ORCID
Jessica Spijkers  http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2598-4507 
R E FE R E N C E S
Allison, E. H., Perry, A. L., Badjeck, M. C., Neil Adger, W., Brown, K., 
Conway, D., … Dulvy, N. K. (2009). Vulnerability of national econo-
mies to the impacts of climate change on fisheries. Fish and Fisheries, 
10, 173–196. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-2979.2008.00310.x
Bailey, M., Sumaila, U. R., & Lindroos, M. (2010). Application of game 
theory to fisheries over three decades. Fisheries Research, 102, 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2009.11.003
Bavinck, M. (2005). Understanding fisheries conflicts in the south—A 
legal pluralist perspective. Society & Natural Resources, 18, 805–820. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920500205491
BBC News. (2016a). Why is the South China Sea contentious? [WWW 
document]. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-pacific-13748349
BBC News. (2016b). South China Sea: Tribunal backs case against China 
brought by Philippines [WWW Document]. Retrieved from http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-36771749 (accessed 1.1.16).
Béné, C., Barange, M., Subasinghe, R., Pinstrup-Andersen, P., Merino, 
G., Hemre, G. I., & Williams, M. (2015). Feeding 9 billion by 2050 – 
Putting fish back on the menu. Food Security, 7, 261–274. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12571-015-0427-z
Bennett, E., Neiland, A., Anang, E., Bannerman, P., Atiq Rahman, A., 
Huq, S., … Clerveaux, W. (2001). Towards a better understanding 
of conflict management in tropical fisheries: Evidence from Ghana, 
Bangladesh and the Caribbean. Marine Policy, 25, 365–376. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(01)00022-7
Bernauer, T., & Bohmelt, T. (2014). Basins at risk: Predicting international 
river basin conflict and cooperation. Global Environmental Politics, 14, 
82–101. https://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP
Blasiak, R., Spijkers, J., Tokunaga, K., Pittman, J., Yagi, N., & Österblom, H. 
(2017). Climate change and marine fisheries: Least developed coun-
tries top global index of vulnerability. PLoS ONE, 12(6), e0179632. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179632
Brochmann, M. (2012). Signing river treaties—Does it improve river co-
operation? International Interactions, 38, 141–163. https://doi.org/10
.1080/03050629.2012.657575
Charles, A. T. (1992). Fishery conflicts: A unified framework. Marine Policy, 
16(5), 379–393. https://doi.org/10.1016/0308-597X(92)90006-B
Cheung, W. W. L., Lam, V. W. Y., Sarmiento, J. L., Kearney, K., Watson, R., Zeller, 
D., & Pauly, D. (2010). Large- scale redistribution of maximum fisheries 
catch potential in the global ocean under climate change. Global Change 
Biology, 16, 24–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2486.2009.01995.x
Cumming, G. S., Olsson, P., Chapin, F. S., & Holling, C. S. (2013). Resilience, 
experimentation, and scale mismatches in social- ecological land-
scapes. Landscape Ecology, 28, 1139–1150. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10980-012-9725-4
Delisle, J. (2012). Troubled waters: China’s claims and the South China 
Sea. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 56, 608–642. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.orbis.2012.08.007
DuBois, C., & Zografos, C. (2012). Conflicts at sea between artisanal and 
industrial fishers: Inter- sectoral interactions and dispute resolution 
in Senegal. Marine Policy, 36, 1211–1220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2012.03.007
Dupont, A., & Baker, C. G. (2014). East Asia’s maritime disputes: Fishing 
in troubled waters. The Washington Quarterly., 37, 79–98. https://doi.
org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893174
European Fisheries and Aquaculture, Research Organisations (EFARO) 
(2012). Climate change and European fisheries: Observed changes and 
future prospects. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: European Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Research Organisations (EFARO).
FAO (2014). The state of world fisheries and aquaculture. Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, https://doi.org/92-5-105177-1
Feinerer, I., & Hornik, K. (2017). tm: Text mining package. R package ver-
sion 0.7-1.
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., & Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive gover-
nance of social- ecological systems. Annual Review of Environment 
and Resources, 30, 441–473. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
energy.30.050504.144511
Gänsbauer, A., Bechtold, U., & Wilfing, H. (2016). SoFISHticated pol-
icy – Social perspectives on the fish conflict in the Northeast 
     |  805SPIJKERS Et al.
Atlantic. Marine Policy, 66, 93–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2016.01.014
Gemenne, F., Barnett, J., Adger, W. N., & Dabelko, G. D. (2014). Climate 
and security: Evidence, emerging risks, and a new agenda. Climatic 
Change, 123, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1074-7
Germond, B. (2015). The geopolitical dimension of maritime se-
curity. Marine Policy, 54, 137–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2014.12.013
Hannesson, R. (2011). Game theory and fisheries. Annual Review 
of Resource Economics, 3, 181–202. https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-resource-083110-120107
Hassani-Mahmooei, B., & Parris, B. W. (2013). Resource scarcity, ef-
fort allocation and environmental security: An agent- based the-
oretical approach. Economic Modelling, 30, 183–192. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.econmod.2012.08.020
Helbing, D. (2013). Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature, 
497, 51–59. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature12047
Hjorth, P., & Bagheri, A. (2006). Navigating towards sustainable develop-
ment: A system dynamics approach. Futures, 38, 74–92. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.futures.2005.04.005
Homer-Dixon, T. (2001). Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M., & Miguel, E. (2013). Quantifying the influence 
of climate on human conflict. Science, 341, 1235367. https://doi.
org/10.1126/science.1235367
Hughes, T. P., Bellwood, D. R., Folke, C., Steneck, R. S., & Wilson, J. (2005). 
New paradigms for supporting the resilience of marine ecosystems. 
Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 20, 380–386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
tree.2005.03.022
ICES Advisory Committee. (2014). Report of the Working Group on Widely 
Distributed Stocks (WGWIDE) report 2014. Copenhagen, Denmark: 
ICES Advisory Committee.
Levin, S., Xepapadeas, T., Crépin, A.-S., Norberg, J., de Zeeuw, A., Folke, 
C., … Walker, B. (2012). Social- ecological systems as complex adap-
tive systems: Modeling and policy implications. Environment and 
Development Economics, 18, 111–132. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1355770X12000460
Lubchenco, J., Cerny-Chipman, E. B., Reimer, J. N., & Levin, S. A. (2016). 
The right incentives enable ocean sustainability successes and provide 
hope for the future. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
113, 14507–14514. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1604982113
Mahoney, J. (2008). Toward a unified theory of causal-
ity. Comparative Political Studies, 41, 412–436. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0010414007313115
Miller, K. A. (2000). Pacific salmon fisheries: Climate, information and 
adaptation in a conflict-ridden context. In S. M. Kane & G. W. Yohe 
(Eds.), Societal adaptation to climate variability and change. Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Springer.
Miller, K. A., Munro, G. R., Sumaila, U. R., & Cheung, W. W. L. (2013). 
Governing marine fisheries in a changing climate: A game- theoretic 
perspective. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 61, 309–334. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/cjag.12011
Mirovitskaya, N. S., & Haney, J. C. (1992). Fisheries exploitation as a threat 
to environmental security. The North Pacific ocean. Marine Policy, 16, 
243–258. https://doi.org/10.1016/0308-597X(92)90043-O
Mitchell, S. M., & Prins, B. C. (1999). Beyond territorial contiguity: Issues at 
stake in democratic militarized interstate disputes. International Studies 
Quarterly, 43, 169–183. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00115
Morrison, T. H. (2017). Evolving polycentric governance of the Great 
Barrier Reef. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114, 
E3013–E3021. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1620830114
Muawanah, U., Pomeroy, R. S., & Marlessy, C. (2012). Revisiting fish 
wars: Conflict and collaboration over fisheries in Indonesia. Coastal 
Management, 40, 279–288. https://doi.org/10.1080/08920753.201
2.677633
Nøttestad, L., Utne, K. R., Óskarsson, G. J., Jónsson, S. Þ., Jacobsen, J. A., 
Tangen, Ø., … Slotte, A. (2014). Abundance and spatial expansion of 
Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) according to trawl 
surveys in the Nordic Seas 2007 to 2013. Working Document (WD) 
to ICES WKPELA.
Österblom, H., Merrie, A., Metian, M., Boonstra, W. J., Blenckner, T., 
Watson, J. R., … Folke, C. (2013). Modeling social—ecological sce-
narios in marine systems. BioScience, 63, 735–744. https://doi.
org/10.1093/bioscience/63.9.735
Pauly, D., Alder, J., Bennett, E., Christensen, V., Tyedmers, P., & Watson, 
R. (2003). The future for fisheries. Science, 302, 1359–1361. https://
doi.org/10.1126/science.1088667
Penney, R., Wilson, G., & Rodwell, L. (2017). Managing sino- ghanaian 
fishery relations: A political ecology approach. Marine Policy, 79, 46–
53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.02.008
Perez, A. (2009). Fisheries management at the tri- national border be-
tween Belize, Guatemala and Honduras. Marine Policy, 33, 195–200. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2008.05.012
Pomeroy, R., Parks, J., Mrakovcich, K. L., & LaMonica, C. (2016). Drivers 
and impacts of fisheries scarcity, competition, and conflict on mar-
itime security. Marine Policy, 67, 94–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2016.01.005
Pomeroy, R., Parks, J., Pollnac, R., Campson, T., Genio, E., Marlessy, C., … 
Thu Hue, N. (2007). Fish wars: Conflict and collaboration in fisheries 
management in Southeast Asia. Marine Policy, 31, 645–656. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2007.03.012
Salehyan, I. (2008). From climate change to conflict? No consen-
sus yet Journal of Peace Research, 45, 315–326. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022343308088812
Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P., & Schilling, J. (2012). 
Climate change and violent conflict. Science (Washington), 336(6083), 
869–871. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1221339
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1993). Property- rights regimes and natural 
resources: A conceptual analysis. Land Economics, 68, 249–262.
Selby, J., & Hoffmann, C. (2014). Beyond scarcity: Rethinking 
water, climate change and conflict in the Sudans. Global 
Environmental Change, 29, 360–370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2014.01.008
Silk, R. J. J. (2001). Nonbinding dispute resolution processes in fisheries 
conflicts: Fish out of water? Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 
16, 791.
Song, Y.-H. (1997). The Canada- European Union turbot dispute in 
the Northwest Atlantic: An application of the incident approach. 
Ocean Development & International Law, 28, 269–311. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00908329709546106
Song, Y.-H., & TØnnesson, S. (2013). The impact of the law of the sea 
convention on conflict and conflict management in the South China 
Sea. Ocean Development & International Law, 44, 235–269. https://
doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2013.808935
Spijkers, J., & Boonstra, W. J. (2017). Environmental change and so-
cial conflict: The northeast Atlantic mackerel dispute. Regional 
Environmental Change, 17, 1835–1851. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10113-017-1150-4
Sumaila, U. R., Cheung, W. W. L., Lam, V. W. Y., Pauly, D., & Herrick, S. 
(2011). Climate change impacts on the biophysics and economics 
of world fisheries. Nature Climate Change, 1, 449–456. https://doi.
org/10.1038/nclimate1301
Taylor, E., Tlusty, M., Eppling, M., Cho, M., Southall, J., Taranovski, T., & 
Clermont, J. (2015). Climate change, the oceans, and the business of 
seafood: A view from the world’s largest food fishery. Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs, 1, 71–86.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2015). Addressing the 
role of natural resources in conflict and peacebuilding: A progress 
report from UNEP’s Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding 
Programme, Nairobi.
806  |     SPIJKERS Et al.
van Herten, M. L., Runhaar, H. A. (2013). Dialogues of the deaf in Dutch 
eel management policy. Explaining controversy and deadlock with 
argumentative discourse analysis. Journal of Environmental Planning 
and Management, 56, 1002–1020. https://doi.org/10.1080/0964056
8.2012.715083
von Uexkull, N., Croicu, M., Fjelde, H., & Buhaug, H. (2016). Civil conflict 
sensitivity to growing- season drought. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 113, 12391–12396. https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1607542113
Wolf, A. T., Yoffe, S. B., & Giordano, M. (2003). International waters: 
Identifying basins at risk. Water Policy, 5, 29–60.
World Ocean Review. (2016). The Northeast Atlantic mackerel – departure 
from the North Sea [WWW Document]. Retrieved from http://world-
oceanreview.com/en/wor-2/fisheries/state-of-fisheries-worldwide/3/
Worm, B. (2016). Averting a global fisheries disaster. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 113, 201604008. https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.1604008113
Yoffe, S., Fiske, G., Giordano, M., Giordano, M., Larson, K., Stahl, K., & 
Wolf, A. T. (2004). Geography of international water conflict and co-
operation: Data sets and applications. Water Resources Research, 40, 
1–12. https://doi.org/10.1029/2003WR002530
Yoffe, S., Wolf, A. T., & Giordano, M. (2003). Conflict and cooper-
ation over international freshwater resources: Indicators of ba-




Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the sup-
porting information tab for this article.  
How to cite this article: Spijkers J, Morrison TH, Blasiak R, 
et al. Marine fisheries and future ocean conflict. Fish Fish. 
2018;19:798–806. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12291
